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Allen Dulles, CIA Father

NEW YORK — Allen Dulles died last week, at 75, after a career that alternated between the spotlight and the darkest corners of government.

As the father of the Central Intelligence Agency, he embodied to many the devil incarnate, a perplexing kind of devil in baggy tweeds, who sucked ruminatively on his pipe and leaned back in his leather chair calmly contemplating the universe. He didn't answer the attacks and told few of the stories which might have helped explain his easy conscience as master of spies and subverter of governments.

Part of the perplexity was due to the silence imposed by his profession. It is a grim one and is conducted under almost overwhelming handicaps by its American practitioner. One story not previously told reflects the basic circumstances.

THE NUMBER of effective Soviet agents in the West has been great, as shown by the many caught in the last generation who must be assumed to represent the visible tip of the iceberg. In that time, there has been only one high-level espionage penetration of the Soviets. It was Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet intelligence officer, who made contact first in London and then operated for a relatively brief time as the most successful Moscow agent the United States ever acquired.

Tremendous effort was taken to protect the secret but Penkovsky was soon uncovered and executed in Moscow in 1962. It is the way the Russians caught him that shows what the CIA is up against.

When he was unmasked, a massive investigation was begun in the United States to find the leak, a reflex of all intelligence services when they lose a man. It was

discovered that a young GI, Sgt. Jack Dunlap of Bogalusa, La., who worked as a messenger in the National Security Agency and had five children, was regularly driving to work in a Cadillac, owned an expensive sports car and otherwise lived beyond his official pay.

Dunlap's dreams of splendor had decided him some years before to contact the Soviets in Washington. That only takes a phone call. They provided him with what his wife later sald was between \$30,000 and \$40,000 a year, a suitable camera and film.

In return, he stopped in his messenger's cubicle for a few minutes every time he took a sheaf of papers from one official's "out" box to another's "in" box and photographed them. From the flow of documents, Moscow saw that the United States did have a new source of information, narrowed the list of suspects and pinpointed Penkovsky.

AS AMERICAN AGENTS began to close in on Dunlap, he committed suicide. His equipment and compromising documents were found in his house.

When the officer in charge of security was reproached for his lax personnel policy, he protested, "What do you want me to do? Run a Gestapo?"

"Yes," answered a civilian with intelligence duties. He didn't mean it that way, but he meant that such a lapse never could happer in Moscow.

There are faults in the organization Dulle built. The gravest, I think, is the urge t influence policy, overstepping the bounds of information supply and policy execution. But the CIA functions more openly than any othe country's intelligence agency, and dange would be much greater without it. Dulles bor responsibility for the mistakes. The rest is this credit.